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Abstract
A popular approach to selling online advertising is by a waterfall, where a pub-
lisher makes sequential price offers to ad networks for an inventory, and chooses
the winner in that order. The publisher picks the order and prices to maximize her
revenue. A traditional solution is to learn the demand model and then subsequently
solve the optimization problem for the given demand model. This will incur a lin-
ear regret. We design an online learning algorithm for solving this problem, which
interleaves learning and optimization, and prove that this algorithm has sublinear
regret. We evaluate the algorithm on both synthetic and real-world data, and show
that it quickly learns high-quality pricing strategies. This is the first principled
study of learning a waterfall design online by sequential experimentation.
1 Introduction
Online publishers typically generate revenue by placing advertisements. For example,
when a user visits a webpage, there are locations called slots each of which may have
an impression of an advertisement (ad).
• A slot may be sold directly to a specific brand advertiser. In that case, when a
user arrives at the webpage, the publisher calls the advertiser and places the ad
returned as the impression.
• A slot may be sold via third parties such as Google’s DoubleClick Ad Exchange.
In this case, when a user arrives at the webpage, the publisher calls the ad ex-
change which in turn calls many intermediaries called ad networks. Each ad
network has several advertisers as its customers and bids on behalf of one of its
chosen customers. The ad exchange runs an auction among the bids and returns
the winner to the publisher which becomes the ad impression for the user.
• A slot may be sold directly to different ad networks. In this case, publishers
typically run what is a called a waterfall. In the waterfall, the publisher chooses a
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permutation of the ad networks. The publisher calls each ad network sequentially
according to the permutation and offers a price. The ad network has to bid above
that price to win the opportunity to place the ad at that slot. If the ad network
does not make an adequate bid, the slot is offered to the next ad network and so
on. The publisher gets to choose the permutation and reserve prices.
The three methods above trade off between control, margins and relationships be-
tween publishers, ad networks and advertisers. Often publishers combine these meth-
ods. For example, publishers might use direct deals for premium slots (like top of
homepages), use waterfall variants for torso inventory, and Ad Exchanges for tail or
remnant slots that did not get sold by the other methods. Readers who wish more
background on the ad business and the role of waterfalls can see [19, 17] or see Dou-
bleClick’s support pages1 2 .
In this paper, we address the central question how publishers can design the wa-
terfall. We formalize this problem as learning the optimal order of ad networks with
their offered prices. Our objective is to maximize the expected revenue of the publisher
online in a sequence of n steps, which is equivalent to minimizing the expected regret
with respect to the best solution in hindsight.
• We formalize and study the problem of publisher learning and optimizing ad rev-
enue from waterfall design as an online learning problem with partial feedback.
• We develop a bandit style solution and propose a computationally-efficientUCB-
like algorithm for this problem, which we call WaterfallUCB1. Our learning
problem is challenging for two reasons. First, the space of feasible solutions,
all permutations of ad networks and their offered prices, is exponentially large.
Second, our problem suffers from partial feedback, which is similar to that in
cascading bandits [11, 12]. In particular, if an ad network accepts an offer, the
learning agent does not learn if any of the subsequent ad networks would have
accepted their offered prices.
• We prove an upper bound on the expectedn-step regret of algorithm WaterfallUCB1.
The upper bound is sublinear in n and polynomial in all other quantities of in-
terest. The key step in our analysis is a new regret decomposition, which is of
independent interest beyond our motivating domain of online advertising.
• We conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world data, which
show that WaterfallUCB1 learns high-quality solutions. In addition, we inves-
tigate several practical settings that are encountered by publishers:
◦ Publishers typically have many web pages with multiple ad slots per page.
We show with real-world data that waterfall learning for all ad slots yields
good solutions when the ad networks behave similarly across the ad slots.
◦ Instead of going directly to ad networks, publishers can go to third parties
that aggregate over ad networks. We show our algorithm WaterfallUCB1
can also learn to sell in this setting and it does not overfit.
1https://support.google.com/dfp_premium/answer/3007370?hl=en
2https://www.sovrn.com/hub/learn/beginners-guide-dfp/
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Taken together, the above represents the first principled study of publisher revenue
when using waterfall to optimize ad placement.
2 Selling in the Waterfall
The problem of selling one ad slot in the waterfall can be formalized as follows. Let
[K] = {1, . . . ,K} be a set of K ad networks. Let Q = {q1, . . . , qM} be a set of M
prices, where qi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [M ]. We use discrete prices as in [6]; they are a first
reasonable approach for the waterfall. We will discuss this further in Section 5. Then
any instance of our problem can be defined by a tuple (K,Q, (Pa)a∈[K]), where Pa is a
probability distribution over the valuation of ad network a. Without loss of generality,
we assume that all prices in Q are in [0, 1], and that the support of Pa is a subset of
[0, 1] for all a ∈ [K]. We assume that the valuation of any ad network a, va ∼ Pa, is
drawn independently from the valuations of all other ad networks.
The publisher sells to the ad networks as follows. First, it chooses a permutation of
the ad networks (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ Π(K) and offered price pi ∈ Q for each ad network
ai, whereΠ(K) is the set of all permutations of [K]. Then the publisher contacts the ad
networks sequentially, from a1 to aK , and tries to sell the ad slot to them. In particular:
• Ad network a1 is contacted first.
• If ad network ai is contacted and pi ≤ vai , the offered price is lower than or
equal to the valuation of ad network ai, the offer is accepted. Then the publisher
earns pi and does not contact any of the remaining ad networks.
• If ad network ai is contacted and pi > vai , the offered price is higher than the
valuation of ad network ai, the offer is rejected. Then the publisher contacts ad
network ai+1 if i < K . If i = K , the publisher does not sell the ad slot and
earns zero.
We denote by A = ((ai)i∈[K], (pi)i∈[K]) the action of the publisher. The set of
feasible actions isA = Π(K)×QK . For any ad network a ∈ [K] and price p ∈ Q, we
define acceptance probability w¯(a, p) = P (p ≤ va), the probability that ad network a
accepts price p under valuation distribution Pa. We refer to any pair of the ad network
and price, (a, p) for a ∈ [K] and p ∈ Q, as an item; and define the set of all items as
E = [K]×Q. Note that |E| = KM . For any action A = ((ai)i∈[K], (pi)i∈[K]) ∈ A
and weight function u : [K]×Q→ [0, 1], we define
f(A, u) =
K∑
i=1
[
i−1∏
k=1
[1− u(aj , pj)]
]
u(ai, pi) pi . (1)
This is the expected revenue of the publisher under action A and acceptance prob-
abilities u. In particular, assuming the valuations of ad networks are independent,∏i−1
j=1[1 − u(aj , pj)] is the probability that all ad networks before ad network ai do
not accept their offered prices, which is equal to the probability that ai is contacted.
Moreover,u(ai, pi) is the conditional probability of ad network ai accepting its offered
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Algorithm 1 Greedy oracle.
Input: Weight function u, number of ad networksK , prices Q
for all a ∈ [K] do
p∗(a)← argmaxp∈Q u(a, p) p
Let pi be any permutation of [K] such that p∗(pi(1)) ≥ . . . ≥ p∗(pi(K))
A← ((pi(i))i∈[K], (p∗(pi(i)))i∈[K])
Output: Publisher action A
price pi after it is contacted. The objective of the publisher is to maximize its expected
revenue by choosingA ∈ A,
A∗ = argmax
A∈A
f(A, w¯) . (2)
We refer to A∗ as the optimal solution.
2.1 Oracles
No polynomial-time algorithm is known for solving all instances of problem (2). How-
ever, computationally-efficient approximations exist [6, 7]. In this work, we consider
approximation algorithms L whose inputs are a weight function u : [K]×Q→ [0, 1],
the number of ad networksK , and a set of pricesQ; and the output is L(u,K,Q) ∈ A.
We say that algorithm L is a γ-approximation for γ ∈ (0, 1] if f(L(u,K,Q), u) ≥
γmaxA∈A f(A, u) for any u.
Note that when ad networks are assigned prices, the optimal order of the ad net-
works is in the descending order of their assigned prices. This follows from the def-
inition of the revenue in (1). Since the output of L can be always ordered to satisfy
this property, we assume that this property is satisfied without loss of generality. We
consider two oracles in this paper, greedy and based on linear programming (LP).
The pseudocode of the greedy oracle is in Algorithm 1. The oracle has two main
stages. First, it assigns to each ad network a ∈ [K] the price that maximizes the ex-
pected revenue of that ad network conditioned on being contacted, p∗(a). Second, it
orders the ad networks in the descending order of their assigned prices. This oracle is
easy to implement and performs well in our experiments. It does not have any approx-
imation guarantee though.
The pseudocode of the LP oracle is in Algorithm 2. The oracle is based on linear
programming and is a (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm [6]. The oracle has three main
stages. First, it solves an LP to obtain the value of the dual variable corresponding to
the last constraint τ∗. Second, it assigns to each ad network a ∈ [K] the price p that
maximizes u(a, p) (p − τ∗). This price is denoted by p∗(a). Finally, it orders the ad
networks in the descending order of their assigned prices.
The optimized variables in the linear program are xa,p and ya,p, for a ∈ [K] and
p ∈ Q. The variable xa,p represents the probability that ad network a is offered price
p. The variable ya,p represents the joint probability that ad network a is offered price
p and accepts. The objective is the expected return. The constraints guarantee that the
probabilities are consistent and non-negative.
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Algorithm 2 LP oracle.
Input: Weight function u, number of ad networksK , prices Q
Solve
max
K∑
a=1
∑
p∈Q
p ya,p
s.t. ∀a ∈ [K], p ∈ Q : ya,p ≤ u(a, p)xa,p , xa,p ≥ 0 , ya,p ≥ 0 ;
K∑
a=1
∑
p∈Q
ya,p ≤ 1 ; ∀a ∈ [K] :
∑
p∈Q
xa,p ≤ 1;
Let τ∗ be the dual variable associated with the last constraint of the above LP
for all a ∈ [K] do
p∗(a)← argmaxp∈Q u(a, p) (p− τ∗)
if (maxp∈Q u(a, p) (p− τ∗) = 0) and (τ∗ ∈ Q) then
p∗(a)← τ∗
Let pi be any permutation of [K] such that p∗(pi(1)) ≥ . . . ≥ p∗(pi(K))
A← ((pi(i))i∈[K], (p∗(pi(i)))i∈[K])
Output: Publisher action A
Both discussed oracles can find high-quality strategies for selling a single ad slot
in the waterfall. In practice, publishers may be interested in maximizing the revenue
from all of their many ad slots. We return to these practical issues in Section 6.
3 Waterfall Bandit
As we discussed earlier, publishers often do not know the valuation distributions of ad
networks in advance. However, since they repeatedly sell ad slots to the ad networks,
they can learn it. This motivates our study of the waterfall as a multi-armed bandit
(MAB) [14, 3], which we call a waterfall bandit. Formally, the waterfall bandit is a
tuple (K,Q, (Pa)a∈[K]), where the valuation distributions of ad networks (Pa)a∈[K]
are unknown to the publisher. Let vt,a ∼ Pa be the stochastic valuation of ad network
a at time t. We assume that vt,a is drawn independently from Pa, both across ad
networks and in time.
The publisher repeatedly sells to ad networks for n times. At each time t, based on
past observations, the publisher adaptively chooses actionAt = ((at,i)i∈[K], (pt,i)i∈[K]),
where at,i ∈ [K] and pt,i ∈ Q are the i-th contacted ad network at time t and its as-
signed price, respectively. The publisher receives feedback Bt ∈ [K] ∪ {∞}, which
is the index of the first ad network that accepts its offered price. In particular, when
Bt = i for i ∈ [K], ad network at,i accepts its offered price pt,i and the reward of the
publisher is pt,i. On the other hand, when Bt = ∞, no ad network accepts its offered
price and the reward of the publisher is zero. Because the ad networks are contacted
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sequentially, the publisher knows that the offered price pt,i is not accepted by any ad
network at,i such that i < Bt for i ∈ [K]. In summary, the publisher observes re-
sponses from all ad networks at,i such that i ≤ Bt for i ∈ [K], and we refer to these
ad networks as being observed.
We evaluate the performance in the waterfall bandit by a form of regret, where the
cumulative reward of the optimal solutionA∗ is weighted by a factor of γ. In particular,
the scaled n-step regret is defined as
Rγ(n) = nγf(A∗, w¯)− E
[
n∑
t=1
f(At, w¯)
]
, (3)
where γ > 0 is the aforementioned scaling factor and A∗ is the optimal solution in
(2). The reason for the scaling factor is that no polynomial-time algorithms exists for
solving our offline optimization problem (Section 2.1). Therefore, it is unreasonable to
assume that we can learn such solutions online, and it is reasonable to compete with the
best offline γ-approximation. Note that the scaled n-step regret reduces to the standard
n-step regret when γ = 1.
Naive Solutions. The waterfall bandit can be solved as a multi-armed bandit problem
where the expected revenue of each actionA ∈ A is estimated separately. This solution
would not be statistically efficient. The reason is that the number of actions is |A| =
K!MK , and so a naive unstructured solution would have exponential regret inK .
The key structure in our learning problem is that the publisher receives feedback
on individual ad networks in each action. This setting is reminiscent of stochastic
combinatorial semi-bandits [9, 8, 13, 18], which can be solved statistically efficiently.
The challenge is that the publisher may not receive feedback on all ad networks. More
specifically, when at,i > Bt at time t, the publisher does not know if ad network at,i
would accepted price pt,i if it was offered that price. Therefore, our problem cannot be
formulated and solved as a stochastic combinatorial semi-bandit.
A similar form of partial feedback was studied in cascading bandits [11], where
the learning agent receives feedback on a ranked list of items, for all items in the list
up to the first clicked item. The difference in our setting is that Kveton et al. [11] do
not consider pricing. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that a similar learning
algorithm, which maintains upper confidence bounds on all acceptance probabilities
w¯(a, p), for any a ∈ [K] and p ∈ Q, could solve our problem. We present such an
algorithm in Section 4.
4 WaterfallUCB1 Algorithm
In this section, we propose a UCB-like algorithm for the waterfall bandit, which we
call WaterfallUCB1. The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.
The inputs to WaterfallUCB1 are an approximation oracle L, the number of ad
networks K , and a set of prices Q. At each time t, WaterfallUCB1 proceeds as fol-
lows. First, it computes an upper confidence bound (UCB)Ut(e) = min{wˆTt−1(e)(e)+
ct−1,Tt−1(e), 1} on the acceptance probability w¯(e) of all e = (a, p) ∈ E, where E
is the set of all ad-network and price pairs (Section 2), wˆs(e) is the fraction of ac-
cepted offers in s trials when ad network a is offered price p, Tt(e) is the number of
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm WaterfallUCB1.
Input: Oracle L, number of ad networksK , prices Q
for all e = (a, p) ∈ E do // Initialization
Offer price p to ad network a once
wˆ0(e)← 1{a accepts price p}, T0(e)← 1
for t = 1, . . . , n do
for all e = (a, p) ∈ E do // Compute UCBs
Ut(e) = min{wˆTt−1(e)(e) + ct−1,Tt−1(e), 1}
At ← L(Ut,K,Q) // Compute the action using the oracle and Ut
Observe Bt ∈ {1, . . . ,K,+∞} // Run the waterfall and get feedback
Tt(e)← Tt−1(e), ∀e ∈ E // Update statistics
for i = 1, . . . ,min{Bt,K} do
e← (at,i, pt,i)
Tt(e)← Tt(e) + 1
wˆTt(e)(e)←
Tt−1(e)wˆTt−1(e)(e) + 1{Bt = i}
Tt(e)
times that ad network a is offered price p up to time t, and ct,s =
√
(1.5 log t)/s
is the radius of a confidence interval around wˆs(e) after t steps such that w¯(e) ∈
[wˆs(e)− ct,s, wˆs(e) + ct,s] holds with a high probability. We trim Ut(e) at 1 so that it
can be interpreted as a probability.
After the UCBs are computed, WaterfallUCB1 computes its action at time t,At =
((at,i)i∈[K], (pt,i)i∈[K]), using the oracleL and UCBs Ut. Then it takes that action and
receives feedback Bt. Finally, WaterfallUCB1 updates its statistics for all observed
pairs of ad networks and prices, (at,i, pt,i) such that i ≤ min{Bt,K}.
5 Analysis
The regret of WaterfallUCB1 is bounded in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let WaterfallUCB1be run in the waterfall bandit with a γ-approximation
oracle L. ThenRγ(n) ≤ 4MK√1.5n logn+γ pi23 MK , whereK is the number of ad
networks andM is the number of prices in Q.
Proof. We sketch the proof of Theorem 1 below. The detailed proof is in Appendix A.
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we show that f(A, u) is monotone in weight
function u for any fixed action A (Lemma A in Appendix A). Second, based on this
monotonicity property, we bound the per-step scaled regret at time t,Rγt = γf(A
∗, w¯)−
f(At, w¯), under “good event” E¯t, that all w¯(e) are inside of their confidence intervals
at time t. This novel regret decomposition is presented in Lemma A below.
Conditioned on “good event” E¯t, the per-step scaled regret at time t is bounded as
Rγt ≤
∑K
i=1 Et
[
1{Gdt,i,t}
]
φdt,i,t , where dt,i = (at,i, pt,i), φe,t = Ut(e)−w¯(e), and
Ge,t is the event that item e is observed at time t.
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The proof of Lemma A is in Appendix A. Note that the lemma decomposes the
regret at time t into those of observed items. Based on the definition of “good event”
E¯t and some algebra, we have
∑n
t=1 E[1{E¯t}Rγt ] ≤ 2
√
1.5 logn
∑
e∈E
∑n
t=1
1√
t
≤
4MK
√
1.5n logn . On the other hand, we bound the regret under “bad event” Et, that
at least one w¯(e) is outside of its confidence interval, using Hoeffding’s inequality.
Specifically, we get
∑n
t=1 E[1{Et}Rγt ] ≤ γ pi
2
3 MK . The bound in Theorem 1 follows
directly from combining the above two inequalities.
Theorem 1 provides aO(MK
√
n logn) gap-free upper bound on the scaled n-step
regret of WaterfallUCB1. We discuss the tightness of this bound below. The depen-
dence on
√
n logn is standard in gap-free bounds in similar problems [13, 12], and it
is considered O(
√
logn) from being tight. The dependence MK is expected, since
WaterfallUCB1 estimatesMK values, one for each ad network and price. However,
linear dependence on MK may not be tight. We obtain it for two reasons. First,
WaterfallUCB1 learns w¯(e) separately for each item e ∈ E, and does not exploit any
generalization across ad networks and prices. Second, our bound is proved directly
from the “self-normalization” of confidence interval radii (Appendix A), not through a
gap-dependent bound as in related papers [13, 12].
Our analysis also provides a sublinear regret bound with respect to the optimal
continuous-price solution. In particular, let all prices be in [0, 1] and suppose the pub-
lisher intends to maximize expected revenue up to time n. When the prices are dis-
cretized on a uniform grid withM points over [0, 1], the maximum instantaneous loss
due to discretization is CK/M , where C is a problem-specific Lipschitz factor. Under
this assumption, the scaled n-step regret with respect to the optimal continuous-price
solution is bounded by O(MK
√
n logn+ γMK) + nCK/M . Now we choose
M =
√
nC/(
√
n logn+ γ)
and we get a O
(
K
√
C · n
√√
n logn+ γ
)
regret bound.
6 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm. We also
investigate the settings where our algorithm may be deployed in practice.
6.1 Methods and Metrics
The input to WaterfallUCB1 is an oracle, which orders ad networks and assigns prices
to them for any model u (Section 2.1). We experiment with two oracles, Greedy (Al-
gorithm 1) and LP (Algorithm 2). We compare the following offline and online ap-
proaches, where X refers to one of the aforementioned oracles:
1. Offline-X is an offline approximation algorithm. The input to the algorithm are
all acceptance probabilities, w¯(a, p) for any a ∈ [K] and p ∈ Q. The probabil-
ities are used by oracle X to order ad networks and assign prices to them. The
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ordering and prices are computed only once and used in all steps. Although this
approach is unrealistic because it assumes that the acceptance probabilities are
known, it is a useful baseline for evaluating revenue loss due to not knowing the
dynamics of the system.
2. UCB-X is the WaterfallUCB1 in Algorithm 3.
3. Exp2-X is an online approximation algorithm, which explores in the first n0 steps
and then exploits [16]. In the first n0 steps, the algorithm offers random prices
to randomly ordered ad networks and collects observations. Then it estimates
all acceptance probabilities from its observations. The probabilities are used by
oracleX to order ad networks and assign prices to them. The ordering and prices
are computed in step n0 and then used in all remaining steps. The exploration
parameter n0 tends to be small in practice because random exploration hurts
experience.
The performance of all compared algorithms is evaluated by their expected n-step
reward,
r(n) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
K∑
i=1

i−1∏
j=1
1
{
pt,j > vt,at,j
}1{pt,i ≤ vt,at,i} pt,i ,
where At =
(
(at,i)i∈[K], (pt,i)i∈[K]
)
is the action of the publisher at time t and vt,a
is the valuation of ad network a at time t. We choose this metric instead of the scaled
regret in (3) because the optimal solution to our offline optimization problem cannot be
computed efficiently (Section 2.1). The optimal solution is necessary to evaluate (3).
We report the expected reward in hypothetical dollars to highlight the business
value of our algorithm.
6.2 Synthetic Data
In this experiment, we show that the expected reward of our algorithm approaches
that of the best approximation in hindsight. We also demonstrate that our algorithm
WaterfallUCB1 outperforms Exp2-X irrespective of the oracle.
We consider a synthetic problem with a single ad slot andK = 4 ad networks. The
valuation of each ad network at time t is drawn i.i.d. from beta distributionBeta(α, β),
which is parameterized by α and β. As a result, the minimum and maximum valuations
of each ad network are $0 and $1 respectively. The valuation of ad network 1 is high,
vt,1 ∼ Beta(5, 2). The valuations of the remaining three ad networks are low, vt,a ∼
Beta(2, 5) for any a ∈ [4] \ {1}. The learning problem is to offer a high price to the ad
network 1, ahead of the other ad networks.
The prices in all algorithms are discretized to 11 price levels, namely Q = {(p −
1)/10 : p ∈ [11]}. We experiment with both Greedy and LP oracles. The number
of exploration steps in Exp2-X is n0 = 500. In this experiment, this setting yields
approximately 11 observations on average for each pair of the ad network and price.
Our results with Greedy oracle are reported in Figure 1a. We observe two ma-
jor trends. First, UCB-Greedy learns quickly. In particular, its expected reward is
9
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Figure 1: Results on synthetic data with a single ad slot. (a) Expected reward of three
approaches with Greedy oracle. (b) Expected reward of the same approaches with LP
oracle.
around 0.5 dollars in 30k steps and exceeds 0.5 dollars after 50k steps. We note that
UCB-Greedy slightly outperformsOffline-Greedy after 50k steps. Indeed, sinceGreedy
oracle is not guaranteed to return the optimal solution, it is possible to learn a better
approximation online than offline. Second, Exp2-Greedy is consistently worse than
UCB-Greedy and its expected reward is only 0.44 dollars in 100k steps. This shows
that n0 = 500 random exploration steps in Exp
2-Greedy are less statistically efficient
than more intelligent continuous exploration in UCB-Greedy.
The results with LP oracle are reported in Figure 1b. We observe similar trends to
those in Figure 1a. One minor difference is that UCB-LP performs worse than Exp2-
LP in the first 150k steps. However, it outperforms Exp2-LP after 200k steps and its
expected reward approaches 0.45 dollars in 300k steps. The reason UCB-LP learns
more slowly than UCB-Greedy is that the linear program in UCB-LP is not sensitive
to small perturbations of model dynamics. That is, minor changes in the optimistic
estimates of acceptance probabilities do not affect the output of the linear program.
Therefore, UCB-LP explores all parameters of the model in the descending order of
prices, which is inefficient. This is because higher prices are always preferred if the
acceptance probabilities at all prices do not differ much. Only when the acceptance
probabilities at higher prices become lower, UCB-LP explores other lower prices.
6.3 Publisher Insights
From the perspective of a publisher, our plots of the expected reward in the first t steps
can answer the following questions: (1) What is the revenue of a strategy up to step t?
(2) What is the difference in revenues of strategies A and B up to step t?
The first question can be answered as follows. The revenue of a strategy up to
step t is equal to its expected reward up to step t times t. In Figure 1a, for instance,
the expected reward of Offline-Greedy in 100k steps is 0.504 dollars. Therefore, the
revenue ofOffline-Greedy in 100k steps is 50.4k dollars. The expected reward ofUCB-
Greedy in 100k steps is 0.507 dollars. Therefore, the revenue of UCB-Greedy in 100k
steps is 50.7k dollars. By the same line of reasoning, the revenue of Exp2-Greedy in
100k steps is 44k dollars.
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Figure 2: Illustration of publisher insights. The gray rectangle represents the revenue of
Exp2-Greedy in 30k steps, 0.438× 30k = 13.14k dollars. The red rectangle represents
the difference in the revenues of UCB-Greedy and Exp2-Greedy in 30k steps, (0.501−
0.438)× 30k = 1.89k dollars.
The second question can be answered as follows. The difference in revenues of
strategies A and B up to step t is equal to the difference of their expected rewards up
to step t times t. We illustrate this in Figure 2. The expected rewards of UCB-Greedy
and Exp2-Greedy in 30k steps are 0.501 and 0.438 dollars, respectively. Therefore, the
difference in their expected rewards is 0.063 dollars, and the difference in their rev-
enues in 30k steps is 1.89k dollars. This increase in revenue is a result of the improved
statistical efficiency of UCB-Greedy relative to Exp2-Greedy.
6.4 Real Data
6.4.1 Selling a Single Ad Slot
In this experiment, we show that our algorithm can learn to sell a single ad slot, whose
dynamics is estimated from a real-world dataset.
We experiment with a real-world dataset of Real-Time Bidding (RTB) iPinYou [15].
This dataset contains information regarding bidding on ad slots, such as the identity of
the ad slot, the winning advertiser, and the winning price. We treat each advertiser
as an ad network. Perhaps surprisingly, the winning price of any advertiser on any ad
slot does not change throughout the dataset. This is common in practice because many
advertisers do not behave very strategically.
We estimate the valuations of ad networks as follows. Fix the ad slot. Let na be the
number of times that advertiser a wins bidding and va be its winning price, which does
not change throughout the dataset. Then ad network a accepts price p, independently
of all other ad networks, with probability
w¯(a, p) =


1{p ≤ va} na∑
a′ na′
, p > 0 ;
1 , p = 0 ;
(4)
where na/
∑
a′ na′ is the frequency with which advertiser a wins bids. Basically,
w¯(a, p) is the empirical distribution of the acceptance probability of ad network a
when offered price p. We assume that the zero price is always accepted. This does
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Figure 3: Real-world problem with a single ad slot. (a) Expected reward up to step t of
Offline-X and UCB-X on the most active ad slot. (b) Average of the expected rewards
of the same approaches over 10 most active ad slots.
not fundamentally change our problem and allows us to avoid boundary cases in our
simulations.
We experiment with 20 most active ad slots in the iPinYou RTB dataset, and refer
to this subset of data as Active20. Specifically, there are nine advertisers bidding on
these ad slots. The prices in the dataset are in [0, 300]. We divide each price by 330 in
order to normalize all prices to [0, 1]. As in Section 6.2, all algorithms operate on 11
discrete price levels. The only major difference from Section 6.2 is that the valuations
of ad networks are distributed according to (4).
Our results on the most active ad slot in Active20 are reported in Figure 3a. We
observe two major trends. First, Offline-X has the same performance irrespective of the
oracle. The expected rewards of both Offline-Greedy and Offline-LP are 0.56 dollars
in 100k steps, or equivalently 56k dollars in revenue. Second, UCB-Greedy learns
faster than UCB-LP. In particular, the expected reward of UCB-Greedy is 0.53 dollars
in 100k steps, or equivalently 53k dollars in revenue. The expected reward of UCB-LP
is 0.41 dollars in 100k steps, or equivalently 41k dollars in revenue. The difference in
the revenues of two approaches in 100k steps is 12k dollars.
We also report the average performance of our algorithms on 10 most active ad
slots in Active20 in Figure 3b. These trends are extremely similar to those in Figure 3a.
This experiment validates that our findings from Figure 3a are not limited to the most
active ad slot, and that they apply to different ad slots.
6.4.2 Selling Multiple Ad Slots
Publishers often have different pages and sell hundreds of ad slots. To facilitate op-
erations and speed up learning, one option is to learn a single selling strategy across
multiple ad slots. In this experiment, we evaluate this option. In particular, if the ac-
ceptance probabilities of ad networks do not change much with the ad slots, learning
of one common model is expected to lead to much faster learning of a near-optimal
policy.
The acceptance probabilities of ad networks are estimated in the same way as Sec-
tion 6.4.1. We consider the following model of interaction with multiple ad slots. Let
12
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Figure 4: Real-world problem with multiple ad slots. (a) Expected reward up to step
t of Offline-X, UCB-X, and Joint-UCB-X on five most active ad slots. (b) Expected
reward of the same approaches on 20 most active ad slots.
m be the number of ad slots. The ad slot at time t is drawn uniformly at random from
thesem ad slots. The publisher knows the identity of the ad slot at time t and its goal is
to maximize its reward, in expectation over the randomness in the choice of the ad slot
at time t and the behavior of ad networks. We propose two solutions to this problem.
One is UCB-X that treats each ad slot separately and computes UCBs for all pairs of ad
networks and prices in each ad slot. The other is Joint-UCB-X that treats all ad slots as
a single slot, and computes UCBs for all pairs of ad networks and prices. Joint-UCB-X
is expected to perform well if the acceptance probabilities of ad networks do not vary
much across ad slots.
Our results onm = 5most active ad slots in Active20 are reported in Figure 4a. We
observe two major trends. First, the expected rewards of bothUCB-X and Joint-UCB-X
improve over time. The expected reward of UCB-Greedy is 0.5 dollars in 100k steps,
or equivalently 50k dollars in revenue. The expected reward of Joint-UCB-Greedy is
0.53 dollars in 100k steps, or equivalently 53k dollars in revenue. Second, Joint-UCB-
X learns faster than UCB-X. In particular, the difference in the expected rewards of
Joint-UCB-Greedy and UCB-Greedy is 0.03 dollars in 100k steps, or equivalently 3k
dollars in revenue. This highlights a common trade-off in learning. Although Joint-
UCB-Greedy learns only an approximate model, this model is easier to learn in a finite
time because it has m times less parameters than UCB-Greedy. We observe the same
trends with LP oracle.
Our results on all the ad slots in Active20 are reported in Figure 4b. These trends
are similar to those in Figure 4a. We note that the benefits of Joint-UCB-Greedy and
Joint-UCB-LP increase withm.
6.4.3 Selling to Aggregated Ad Networks
A common scenario is that publishers interact with third parties, which aggregate mul-
tiple ad networks. In this section, we study the impact of ad network aggregation on
learning publisher revenue.
The third parties are modeled as follows. All ad networks are partitioned into h
groups,G1, . . . , Gh. The values for h will be specified later. When price p is offered to
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Figure 5: Real-world problem with aggregated ad networks. (a) Expected reward up to
step t of Offline-X and UCB-X over the fixed partition of the most active ad slot. (b)
Average of the expected rewards of the same approaches over 10 random partitions.
groupGi, any ad network a ∈ Gi accepts the offered price with probability w¯(a, p) in
(4), independently of all other ad networks. If at least one a ∈ Gi accepts, Gi accepts.
From the point of view of the publisher and our algorithms, each group is treated as an
ad network.
Learning with Aggregated Ad Networks. We first show that our algorithm can
learn to sell to aggregated ad networks. We also show that LP oracle leads to faster
learning than Greedy oracle when the dynamics of selling is more complicated.
We set h = 2 and evaluate Offline-X and UCB-X on the most active ad slot in
Active20 dataset under two settings. In the first experiment, we fix six ad networks
in G1 and put the remaining three ad networks in G2. In the second experiment, we
put six random ad networks in G1 and the remaining three ad networks in G2. This
experiment is repeated with 10 random partitions.
The results of the first experiment are shown in Figure 5a. We observe one major
trend. The expected reward of UCB-X converges to that of the best approximation in
hindsight irrespective of the oracle. For example, the expected reward of Offline-X is
around 0.48 dollars in 100k steps, or equivalently 48k dollars in revenue. The expected
reward of UCB-X reaches almost 0.478 dollars in 100k steps, or equivalently 47.8k
dollars in revenue. The difference in revenues is merely 200 dollars, which indicates
that UCB-X can learn a very good approximation in this experiment.
The results of the second experiment are shown in Figure 5b. We make two addi-
tional observations. First, the trends are very similar to those in Figure 5a. This shows
that our algorithm UCB-X does not overfit to a specific group of ad networks. Second,
algorithms with LP oracle learn slightly faster than those with Greedy oracle. For ex-
ample, the expected reward of UCB-Greedy and UCB-LP are respectively 0.491 and
0.493 dollars in 60k steps. The difference of the expected rewards is 0.002 dollars in
60k steps, or equivalently 120 dollars in revenue.
Publisher revenue with Aggregated Ad Networks. Finally, we study the impact of
ad network aggregation on the expected revenue of publisher.
Again, we evaluate Offline-X and UCB-X on the most active ad slot in Active20
dataset but under three different configurations:
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Figure 6: Impact of three configurations of aggregated ad networks on expected rev-
enues. (a) Publisher expected reward up to step t for oracle Greedy. (b) Publisher
expected reward up to step t for oracle LP.
1. Configuration 1: h = 2 with group sizes of six and three.
2. Configuration 2: h = 3 with group sizes of four, four and one.
3. Configuration 3: h = 9 where all group sizes are one.
These configurations represent different degrees of ad network aggregation. In all the
configurations, the ad networks are partitioned in a uniformly random fashion. Each
configuration is repeated for 10 times.
The results of oracles Greedy and LP are respectively reported in Figure 6a and
Figure 6b. We observe the similar results to the previous experiment that our algorithms
can learn to sell under all the configurations of ad network aggregations. Moreover, we
observe two additional interesting trends.
First, less aggregation of ad networks results in higher expected reward. Take the
oracle Greedy as example. As shown in Figure 6a, the expected rewards of Offline-
Greedy and UCB-Greedy under Configuration 3 are respectively 0.576 and 0.556 dol-
lars in 100k steps. They are both higher than the expected rewards acquired from other
configurations where ad networks aggregate into groups. One explanation is that less
aggregation of ad networks allows the publisher to better customize prices to ad net-
works, and hence the expected reward is higher.
Second, less aggregation of ad networks requires longer time to find the optimal
solution, especially for the algorithm UCB-LP. To illustrate this phenomenon, we run
all algorithms with oracle LP for more steps (t = 500k). As shown in Figure 6b, the
expected reward of UCB-LP reaches 0.513 dollars in 500k steps when there are nine
individual ad networks (Configuration 3). It exceeds the expected reward of 0.492 dol-
lars in the case of two aggreated groups (Configuration 1) and is close to 0.519 dollars
of three groups (Configuration 2). With less aggregation, although our algorithm sta-
tistically should be able to collect more responses per waterfall run, it needs to learn
the behavior of more groups.
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7 Related Work
Our work is at the intersection of online advertising and online learning with partial
feedback.
The problem of waterfall optimization was studied before under the name of “se-
quential posted price mechanisms” [7, 6, 1, 4, 10]. In [7, 6, 1], the acceptance prob-
abilities of ad networks are assumed to be known by the publisher. [4, 10] study the
waterfall optimization problem in an online setting, under the assumption that all ad
networks have the same acceptance probabilities. We do not make any of these as-
sumptions.
Our work is a generalization of online learning to rank in the cascade model [11,
12]. More specifically, cascading bandits can be viewed as waterfall bandits whenQ =
{1}. This seemingly minor change has major implications. For instance, when Q =
{1}, the optimal solution in (2) can be computed greedily. In our case, no polynomial-
time algorithm is known for solving (2). From the learning point of view, we learnKM
statistics. In cascading bandits, onlyK statistics are learned becauseM = |Q| = 1.
Our problem is a form of partial monitoring [5, 2], which is a harder class of learn-
ing problems than multi-armed bandits. The general algorithms in partial monitoring
cannot solve our problem computationally efficiently because their computational cost
is Ω(|A|), where |A| is exponential in the number of ad networks.
Our setting is also reminiscent of stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits [9, 8, 13,
18], which can be solved statistically efficiently by UCB-like algorithms. The differ-
ence is that our feedback is less than semi-bandit. In particular, if an ad network accepts
an offer, the learning agent does not learn if any of the subsequent ad networks would
have accepted their offered prices. In combinatorial semi-bandits, all of these events are
assumed to be observed. Therefore, our problem cannot be solved as a combinatorial
semi-bandit.
8 Conclusions
For the waterfall, we propose the algorithm WaterfallUCB1, a computationally and
sample efficient online algorithm for learning to price, which maximizes the expected
revenue of the publisher. We derive a sublinear upper bound on the n-step regret of
WaterfallUCB1. Note that WaterfallUCB1 solves a general problem of learning
to maximize (2) from partial feedback. Therefore, although our main focus is online
advertising, the algorithm may have other applications, especially in learning to price.
We evaluate WaterfallUCB1 on both synthetic and real-world data, and show that
it quickly learns competitive strategies to the best approximations in hindsight. In
addition, we investigate multiple real-world scenarios that are of a particular interest
of publishers. We show that WaterfallUCB1 can learn to sell in these scenarios and it
does not overfit.
We leave open several questions of interest. For instance, note that the update
of statistics in WaterfallUCB1 can be easily modified to leverage the following two
monotonicity properties. When ad network a accepts price p, it would have accepted
any lower price p′ < p. Similarly, when ad network a does not accept price p, it
16
would have not accepted any higher price p′ > p. Roughly speaking, this would make
WaterfallUCB1more statistically efficient. However, it is non-trivial to prove that this
would result in a better regret bound than that in Section 5. We leave these for future
work.
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A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove that the function f(A, u) is monotone in the weight function u, for any
fixed action A.
Consider w¯, v¯ ∈ [0, 1][K]×Q such that for all i ∈ [K], j ∈ Q, w¯(i, j) ≤ v¯(i, j). If
the items of action A are sorted in descending order of prices, then
f(A, w¯) ≤ f(A, v¯) (5)
Proof. We prove Lemma A based on the mathematical induction onK , the number of
ad networks.
Induction base: We first prove that equation 5 holds for the case with K = 1. Notice
that forK = 1,
f(A, w¯) = p1w¯(a1, p1) ≤ p1v¯(a1, p1) = f(A, v¯) (6)
Induction step: For any integer m ≥ 1, we then prove that if equation 5 holds for
K = m, then it also holds for K = m + 1. Recall that for K = m + 1, A =
((a1, p1), . . . , (am+1, pm+1)). To simplify the exposition, we also define the term A˜ =
((a2, p2), . . . , (am+1, pm+1)). Notice that
f(A, w¯) =w¯(a1, p1)p1 + (1− w¯(a1, p1))f(A˜, w¯)
(a)
≤ w¯(a1, p1)p1 + (1− w¯(a1, p1))f(A˜, v¯)
where (a) follows the induction hypothesis. Moreover, since f(A˜, v¯) is the expected
revenue of A˜, f(A˜, v¯) ≤ p2 ≤ p1. Therefore,
0 ≤ (p1 − f(A˜, v¯))(v¯(a1, p1)− w¯(a1, p1)) (7)
which implies
w¯(a1, p1)p1 + (1 − w¯(a1, p1))f(A˜, v¯) ≤ v¯(a1, p1)p1 + (1− v¯(a1, p1))f(A˜, v¯) = f(A, v¯)
As a result, f(A, w¯) ≤ f(A, v¯).
We now prove Theorem 1. First, we define the “bad event” Et at time t as the event
that at least one w¯(e) is outside its confidence interval at time t,
Et = {∃e ∈ E s.t. |w¯(e)− wˆTt−1(e)(e)| > ct−1,Tt−1(e)} . (8)
Notice that E¯t, the complement of Et, is considered as the “good event” at time t.
Similar to [11], we define the eventGe,t as the event that item e = (a, p) is “observed”
at time t (i.e. ad network a is called and offered price p at time t):
Ge,t ={∃1 ≤ k ≤ K ∋ dt,k = e,Bt ≥ k} (9)
19
where dt,i = (at,i, pt,i). In addition, we define Et[·] = E[·|Ht] where Ht is the history
of all actions and feedbacks until time t − 1 plus the action At, which is determined
by Ht under Algorithm 3. The following lemma bounds the per-step scaled regret
Rγt = γf(A
∗, w¯)− f(At, w¯) under the “good event” E¯t:
Conditioned on “good event” E¯t, the per-step scaled regret at time t is bounded as
Rγt ≤
∑K
i=1 Et
[
1{Gdt,i,t}
]
φdt,i,t , where dt,i = (at,i, pt,i), φe,t = Ut(e)−w¯(e), and
Ge,t is the event that item e is observed at time t.
Proof. Conditioning on the event E¯t, we have w¯ ≤ Ut. Lemma A states that w¯ ≤ Ut
implies f(A, w¯) ≤ f(A,Ut). Then we have the following bound on Rγt :
Rγt
(a)
=γf(A∗, w¯)− f(At, w¯)
(b)
≤γf(A∗, Ut)− f(At, w¯)
≤γmax
A
f(A,Ut)− f(At, w¯)
(c)
≤f(At, Ut)− f(At, w¯), (10)
where (a) follows from the definition ofRγt , (b) follows from LemmaA, and (c) follows
from the fact that At is computed from a γ-approximation algorithm.
To simplify the exposition, in the rest of this proof, we use w¯i andUi to respectively
denote w¯(at,i, pt,i) and Ut(at,i, pt,i), and use pi to denote pt,i. Then we have
Rγt
(a)
≤
K∑
i=1

∏
j<i
[1− Uj]

Uipi − K∑
i=1

∏
j<i
[1− w¯j ]

 w¯ipi
(b)
≤
K∑
i=1

∏
j<i
[1− w¯j ]

Uipi − K∑
i=1

∏
j<i
[1− w¯j ]

 w¯ipi
(c)
=
K∑
i=1

∏
j<i
[1− w¯j ]

 (Ui − w¯i) pi
(d)
≤
K∑
i=1

∏
j<i
[1− w¯j ]

 (Ui − w¯i) , (11)
where (b) follows from w¯i ≤ Ui for all i under event E¯t, and (d) follows from 0 <
pi ≤ 1 for all i. Notice that Ui − w¯i is the “item-wise” difference between the upper
confidence and the mean, and
∏
j<i[1 − w¯j ] is the conditional probability that the ith
ad network will be called. We have∏
j<i
[1− w¯j ] = Et
{
1{Gdt,i,t}
}
. (12)
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From (11), we have
Rγt ≤
K∑
i=1
Et
{
1{Gdt,i,t}
}
φ(at,i,pt,i),t . (13)
We use LemmaA to boundRγ(n) as follows. Notice thatRγ(n) = E[
∑n
t=1 1{Et}Rγt ]+
E[
∑n
t=1 1{E¯t}Rγt ]. We use e to refer to an item in E. As discussed, all prices are less
or equal to 1; so, 0 ≤ f(A,w) ≤ 1. Hence, we have Rγt ≤ γ. As a result,
E[
n∑
t=1
1{Et}Rγt ] ≤ γE[
n∑
t=1
1{Et}]
≤γ
∑
e∈E
n∑
t=1
t∑
s=1
P(|w¯(e)− wˆs(e)| ≥ ct,s)
(a)
≤2γ
∑
e∈E
n∑
t=1
t∑
s=1
exp(−3 log t)
≤2γ
∑
e∈E
n∑
t=1
t−2 ≤ γ pi
2
3
|E| = γ pi
2
3
MK
In the above derivation, (a) follows Hoeffding’s inequality. Notice that for all e ∈
E and t ≤ n, we have (1) φe,t ≤ 2ct−1,Tt−1(e) under event E¯t, (2) ct−1,Tt−1(e) ≤
cn,Tt−1(e). Based on Lemma A, we have
E
[
n∑
t=1
1{E¯t}Rγt
]
≤
∑
e∈E
E
[
n∑
t=1
1{E¯t, Ge,t}φe,t
]
≤ 2
∑
e∈E
E
[
n∑
t=1
1{E¯t, Ge,t}ct−1,Tt−1(e)
]
≤ 2
√
1.5 logn
∑
e∈E
E
[
n∑
t=1
1{E¯t, Ge,t}
√
1
Tt−1(e)
]
Notice that Tt−1(e) ≤ n and once e is observed, Tt(e) is increased by 1, thus we have
E[
n∑
t=1
1{E¯t, Ge,t}
√
1
Tt−1(e)
] ≤
n∑
t=1
1√
t
≤ 1 +
∫ n
1
1√
t
dt ≤ 2√n− 1 < 2√n
Recall that |E| = MK , we have
E[
n∑
t=1
1{E¯t}Rγt ] ≤ 4MK
√
1.5n logn
This concludes the proof for Theorem 1.
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